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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I undertake textual exegesis and rational reconstruc-tion of Mukula Bha৬৬a’s AbhidhƗ-v܀tta-mƗt܀ka, or “The Fundamentals 
of the Communicative Function.” The treatise was written to refute 
Ɩnandavardhana’s claim, made in the DhvanyƗloka, that there is a 
third “power” of words, vyañjanƗ (suggestion), beyond the two already 
accepted by traditional Indian philosophy: abhidhƗ (denotation) and 
lak܈a۬Ɨ (indication).1 I argue that the explanation of lak܈a۬Ɨ as pre-
sented in his text contains internal tensions, although it may still be a 
compelling response to Ɩnandavardhana.
 Mukula argues that the postulated power of vyañjanƗ  can be iden-
tified as lak܈a۬Ɨ, one of the two well-established powers. I claim that 
Mukula’s theory presents two logically distinct notions of lak܈a۬Ɨ and 
that he does not carefully distinguish between them. I show this by 
analysis of a few of the many examples surveyed in the text.2 I utilize 
two concepts from modern analytic philosophy in my reconstruction of 
Mukula’s arguments: metonymic sort-shifting and Gricean pragmatic 
implication. While Mukula’s argument that vyañjanƗ is equivalent to 
lak܈a۬Ɨ may be successful, I conclude that his claim must be made more 
precise: vyañjanƗ is equivalent to only a subvariety of lak܈a۬Ɨ, which I 
call “pragmatic indication.”
MUKULA BHA৫৫A ON MUKHYA AND LAK܇A۫Ɩ
Broadly speaking, the Indian philosophical tradition distinguishes 
between two functions (vyƗpƗra) or powers (Ğakti) of words: denotation 
(mukhya or abhidhƗ) and indication (lak܈a۬Ɨ).3 Toward the beginning 
of his treatise, Mukula Bha৬৬a defines mukhya and lak܈a۬Ɨ in this way:
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It is said that: Denoted meaning is what is comprehended from the 
word’s function,
Indicated meaning is understood additionally from that meaning.4
According to Mukula, when the power of words is “expended” by denot-
ing their referent (which can be a universal, a quality, an action, or a 
named thing), the power of indication (lak܈a۬Ɨ) comes into operation if 
there is still work to be done.5 In other words, powers are demarcated 
based on their effects. Denotation’s effect is the cognition of a referent 
by a hearer. Indication’s effect is some further cognition. As well, deno-
tation and indication are distinguished based on their domains. In the 
verse above, mukhya and lak܈a۬Ɨ are different not only because they 
perform different functions but because they operate on different enti-
ties. Denotation is Ğabda-vyƗpara, or the function of a word; indication 
functions on the meaning resulting from this first function.6
MUKHYA OR WORD DENOTATION
Mukula then describes the function of denotation (mukhya):
It is due to the function of words that we have an understanding of 
the denotative meaning, and this understanding is avyƗdhƗna, or 
without an interruption or an interval.7
Literal meaning is obtained simply by considering the word. Mukula 
uses the term mukhya because of a similarity between literal meaning 
and the face (mukha means “face” in Sanskrit). On this analogy, the 
face is seen first, before the limbs and extremities of a person. Like-
wise, denoted meaning (mukhya-artha) is understood before any other 
meanings.8 This is, prima facie, a claim about the phenomenology of an 
individual hearer’s cognition. If taken this way, it is easily falsifiable. We 
are not always consciously aware of the literal meaning of a figuratively 
intended utterance first. And while the phenomenology of interpretation 
does often play a role in Indian theorizing about language, Mukula is not 
taking such an obviously wrong position. Later in the very same text, 
he argues that the meanings of many metaphors (which are instances 
of lak܈a۬Ɨ) are understood without any awareness of their underlying 
literal meanings.9 However, the literal meaning is recoverable through 
reflection because the figurative meaning is dependent on it.10 The 
charitable reading is that this analogy is making a logical claim: literal 
meaning or mukhya is required for the existence of indicated meaning, 
since indicated meaning is dependent on the literal.
 Mukula claims that words denote, by mukhya, universals, qualities, 
actions, or objects of proper names. The referent of words was a subject 
of much debate among, and within, the various Indian philosophical 
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schools. The MƯmƗূsƗ, with whom Mukula is aligned in many ways, 
were divided on the question.11 The BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ, following KumƗrila 
Bha৬৬a (660 CE), argue that words refer to universals. They present 
several arguments for this view, among them that understanding of a 
universal is necessary before an interpreter could understand a particu-
lar. The PrƗbhƗkara MƯmƗূsƗ, following PrabhƗkara (700 CE), argue 
that words cannot refer to anything except in connection with other 
words in a sentence token.12 They point out that, even if there is some 
cognition of a universal when someone utters a sentence, if we are to 
take an action based on the sentence, we must understand a particular 
thing to be meant. Thus words will not always refer to universals, but 
sometimes to a particular.13
 Mukula himself takes up a third position, consonant with the tradi-
tion of the Grammarians. In citing Patañjali (ca. 200 CE), author of 
the MahƗbhƗ܈ya, he explicitly argues against the BhƗ৬৬a view, claiming 
that four lexical categories (universal-denoting words, quality-denoting 
words, action-denoting words, and proper names) correspond to four 
different ontological categories (upƗdhi) that determine the word’s 
denotation. Even though Mukula spends most of his treatise analyzing 
lak܈a۬Ɨ, the discussion of the categorical divisions of mukhya is not 
trivial. His proposal for indication must be consistent with his analysis 
of denotation.
SUGGESTION AND DHVANI
While cognitions of words and their literally denoted meanings constitute 
much of a given speech act’s effect on hearers, we frequently—in both 
poetic and nonpoetic contexts—also uptake tinges of emotional inflec-
tions, unstated implications of facts, or metaphors that are implied at 
the level of an entire text. Ɩnandavardhana (820–890 CE), author of the 
DhvanyƗloka, thinks that vyañjanƗ, or “suggestion,” can explain these 
things. Further, when we are in a poetic context, unlike many conven-
tional situations, these implicit meanings are the predominant aim of 
the writer or orator. In conversation, our word choice may sometimes 
convey certain emotions, but in poetry, the goal is always beautiful aes-
thetic experience (rasa). Ɩnandavardhana argues that denoted meaning 
and indicated meaning alone are insufficient as a characterization of 
the full range of poetic meaning:
If [suggested] meaning were denotative, one would get to it by a 
knowledge of literal, denotative meanings, and the words that convey 
them. But this meaning is beyond the range of those who have taken 
pains only on the definitions of words and who have paid no attention 
to the study of poetic meaning.14
 SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 313
HPQ 30_4 text.indd   313 1/21/14   10:55 AM
314 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
Below are Ɩnandavardhana’s central arguments for the distinctiveness 
of suggestion from indications:
Argument from Primariness
[S]econdary usage is a nonprimary (amukhya) operation of a word, 
whereas suggestiveness is a primary (mukhya) operation, for not the 
slightest hint of a non-primary nature can be observed in our appre-
hension of any of the three types of suggested sense.
Argument from Kind of Operation
[S]econdary usage may be called a denotative operation applied in a 
non-primary way, whereas suggestiveness is entirely different from 
denotation.
Argument from Transformation
[I]n secondary usage a meaning that indicates a secondary meaning 
becomes transformed into that indicated meaning, as in ga۬gƗyƗۨ 
gho܈aۊ(“a village on the Ganges”); whereas in the process of sugges-
tion the meaning that suggests a second meaning is apprehended to 
reveal that second meaning only by revealing itself at the same time.15
The “Argument from Primariness” is that indication functions by operating 
on the results of the operation of denotation and that suggestion oper-
ates on the word itself. Thus, they have different domains. For example, 
according to Ɩnandavardhana, if I say “A village is on the Ganges” (an 
example that we will investigate in more detail later), denotation functions 
on the words “village” and “Ganges.” This means the village is directly 
on the river. By indication operating on the resultant meanings, I come 
to know that the river is on the bank of the Ganges and not directly upon 
the river. The suggested meaning is that the village is cool and pure be-
cause the Ganges river, the literal denotation of “Ganges,” actually has 
these properties.
 The “Argument from Kind of Operation” is that the coolness and 
purity of the village is suggested and not denoted. One could say that 
the indicated statement is true only if the village is on the bank of the 
river. Thus, indication is like a kind of denotation. In contrast, the 
suggested meaning in this statement aims at a particular aesthetic 
experience, not communication of a fact. There are suggested facts 
(termed vastu-dhvani) and suggested figures (alaۨkƗra-dhvani), but 
Ɩnandavardhana is primarily concerned with the kind of suggestion 
that, when predominant in a poem, forms the basis for an experience 
of beauty. (When suggested meaning or vyañjanƗ is predominant in a 
statement or discourse, it is called dhvani.)
 Finally, Ɩnandavardhana argues in the “Argument from Trans-
formation” that, in the process of indication, the literal meaning is 
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replaced with the indicated meaning, whereas suggestion allows for 
the cognition of both a suggested meaning and a literal (or indicated) 
meaning at the same time. There can be the suggestion of beauty at 
the same time as the understanding of the truth-conditional content 
of a statement.
 Mukula’s goal is to show that purported instances of suggestion can 
be reduced to lak܈a۬Ɨ, or indication.16 Thus, he must be precise about 
the domain of each power, to argue successfully that vyañjanƗ is simply 
another term for lak܈a۬Ɨ. In response to Ɩnandavardhana’s Argument 
from Primariness, Mukula must show that suggestion shares the 
same domain as indication. To counteract the Argument from Kind of 
Operation, he must show that the kind of suggestion whose function is 
the generation of aesthetic experience can be explained by indication. 
Finally, Mukula must show that indication does not always replace 
the literal meaning, as in the Argument from Transformation. The 
table below illustrates how Mukula conceives his model as supplant-
ing Ɩnandavardhana’s.
 In this paper, I focus on Mukula’s replies to the Argument from Primari-
ness and the Argument from Transformation. I think that his responses 
to these first two arguments are stronger than to the last (Argument 
from Kind of Operation), in large part because I think it is a misstep for 
Mukula to grant Ɩnandavardhana’s assumption that aesthetic experi-
ence should be considered “meaning” in the same way as the other two 
subvarieties of indication. The problem of whether aesthetic experience 
can be counted as “meaning” in the same way as indicated and denoted 
meanings is too complex to investigate in this short space.
INDICATION OR SECONDARY MEANING
To explain the function of lak܈a۬Ɨ, Mukula distinguishes between a 
speaker (vakt܀), a sentence meaning (vƗkya), and the utterance meaning 
(vƗcya). A speaker is simply someone who speaks a sentence (vƗkya) in 
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Table 1. Mukula and Ɩnanda’s conceptions of linguistic powers
 Mukula Bha৬৬a Ɩnandavardhana
 mukhya mukhya 
 Denotation Denotation
  lak܈a۬Ɨ
  Indication
  vyañjanƗ
  Suggestion
lak܈a۬Ɨ
Indication
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order for hearer to understand something. The term vƗkya refers to a 
syntactically unified expression constituting a meaning (eka-arthaۊ). In 
contrast, the gerundive vƗcya, literally, “that which is to be said,” refers 
to what is conveyed by either mukya or lak܈a۬Ɨ by means of what the 
words denote.17 Mukula also distinguishes between contextual factors: 
place (deĞa), time (kƗla), and circumstance (avasthƗ).
 With these distinctions in hand, Mukula argues that lak܈a۬Ɨ is a 
matter of relating the utterance meaning to the sentence meaning, by 
making use of these contextual factors. In terms contemporary philoso-
phers would recognize, utterance meaning is determined by the context, 
which consists of a speaker, place, time, and world (what Mukula calls 
“circumstance”). While he is not working with any explicitly modal 
framework like David Lewis’s possible worlds, Mukula’s notion of cir-
cumstance evidently goes beyond simply the place at which an utterance 
is taking place, since it is mentioned as being separate.18 It might refer 
to facts about the way the world is when a speaker utters a sentence 
(the term means something like “condition,” “state,” or “situation” and 
is used in Sanskrit dramaturgy to describe stages of development in a 
plot), but he says nothing more about this contextual factor.
 The general way in which indication is employed is a form of inference 
called arthƗpatti or presumption. MƯmƗূsƗ philosopher ĝabara (ca. 100 
BCE) defines presumption as “the presuming of something not seen, 
on the ground that a fact already seen or heard of cannot be explained 
without that presumption.”19 The traditional example is that, if we are 
given the facts that (1) Devadatta is alive and (2) Devadatta is not in his 
house, we must presume that Devadatta is alive outside of his house.
 We can generalize about the form of presumption as follows:
Presumption q is presumed from p and m if:
1. p and m are two already-established facts and
2. The presumption of q is required to make p consistent with m.
What lak܈a۬Ɨ does, by means of arthƗpatti, is to remove the apparent in-
consistency between, for example, the sentence meaning and facts about 
the speaker or the sentence meaning and facts about the circumstance.
 A similar strategy is employed a little over a thousand years later by 
H. P. Grice, in “Logic and Conversation.” He proposes a principle that he 
takes to guide the rationality of contributions to a conversation, at least 
when that conversation can be understood as being a cooperative effort:
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Cooperative Principle. Make your conversational contribution such as 
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose 
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.20
This principle is then divided into Grice’s familiar four categories of 
maxims (some of which are divisible into submaxims) including the 
Maxim of Quantity, the Maxim of Quality, the Maxim of Relation, and 
the Maxim of Manner. With these maxims, Grice formulates the idea 
of conversational implicature, which he uses to explain how it is that 
we can utter a sentence like “He is in the grip of a vice” and mean by 
it that someone is caught in a bad character trait, not that someone is 
physically trapped by an instrument.
 Conversational Implicature S conversationally implicates that q in 
saying that p if S implicates q when:
1. S is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims (or 
the Cooperative Principle).
2. The supposition that S thinks that q is required to make say-
ing “that p” consistent with this presumption.
3. S thinks, and expects H to think that S thinks, the hearer can 
work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that q is 
required.
The structure of Gricean conversational implicature and MƯmƗূsaka 
arthƗpatti are closely analogous. In a case of lak܈a۬Ɨ, we are presented 
with a sentence meaning p and we must presume that S is implicating q 
by saying “that p.” The inconsistency arises between the sentence mean-
ing p and some facts about the speaker, place, time, or circumstance, 
which I above represented with m. On this reconstruction, m stands in 
for the conversational maxim(s) that have to do with these contextual 
facts. Thus, lak܈a۬Ɨ is essentially a form of implicature that functions 
by reconciling the sentence meaning with contextual factors. If this were 
indeed the case, we could neatly distinguish between mukhya as being 
the literal meaning of the constituent words in a sentence (meanings 
such as universals, qualities, actions, and objects of proper names) and 
lak܈a۬Ɨ as being what is implicated by the utterance of such a sentence 
in a given context. Unfortunately, things are not so simple.
 In what follows, I survey several examples of lak܈a۬Ɨ given by Mu-
kula. I will demonstrate that this distinction cannot be maintained, at 
a detriment to Mukula’s claim that he has given a consistent account 
of the proper domains of mukhya and lak܈a۬Ɨ. However, I argue that 
he has still given a cogent reply to Ɩnandavardhana’s argument that a 
new linguistic power must be assumed.
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MUKULA’S INTRODUCTION TO LAK܇A۫Ɩ
The first example of lak܈a۬Ɨ that Mukula analyzes is
(1) gaur anubandhyaۊ(The cow is to be tied up)
Based on what Mukula has said earlier about the referents of words, this 
sentence, which in Sanskrit consists of a noun and a gerundive, contains 
a universal-denoting term and an action-denoting term. Its denoted mean-
ing, as understood from the powers of the words in composition, is that 
cowhood is the object of the action of tying. However, Mukula points out 
that it would not make sense to instruct someone to fasten the universal 
of cowhood to a stake in order to make a sacrifice, the context for this 
sentence. And further, he adds that the referential function of “gaur” has 
been exhausted by denoting cowhood because the denotative task of a word 
is simply to give its referent. This means that we have what is essentially 
a list: cowhood, to be brought. On the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ view, in order for 
“gaur” to have a syntactic relationship with “anubandhyaۊ,” we must 
understand it as indicating a particular (though perhaps not a definite) 
cow, by lak܈a۬Ɨ. KumƗrila makes a similar observation about the sentence:
(2) gam Ɨnaya (Bring a cow)
Regarding this sentence, he says that “bring” simply gives us the general 
act of bringing, not the tense or injunctive mood. He reiterates Mukula’s 
analysis of “cow” as referring to a universal. In this context, it is evident 
that a single cow is required, though maybe not Bessie as opposed to 
another cow, and so “a cow.” He concludes that indication is responsible 
for the words having meanings (like particulars or temporally defined 
actions) that can be related to the other words in the sentence.21 Mu-
kula only asserts that there is indication of the particular cow, not the 
particular action. The text is characteristically terse in its analysis, 
so it is unclear if this is due to Mukula’s Grammarian notion of word 
reference or if he thinks that the process of lak܈a۬Ɨ is clear enough that 
he need not deal with the gerundive. One thing is clear: where a BhƗ৬৬a 
MƯmƗূsaka would appeal to lak܈a۬Ɨ to explain a universal-denoting 
word being used as a quality, Mukula would not need to make such a 
move. In either case, lak܈a۬Ɨ here follows the typical structure of a 
presumptive inference. The inference is based on conflict between the 
known fact that “gaur” refers to cowhood (this is taken to as given by 
Mukula) and the fact that the referent of “gaur” must be the object of 
being tied up. Below, I reconstruct the presumption explicitly:
 Presumption of a Particular Cow. A particular cow is presumed from 
the fact that “cow” refers to cowhood and the fact that the referent of “cow” 
must be the object of being tied up if
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1. The fact that “cow” refers to cowhood and the fact that the 
referent of “cow” must be the object of being tied up are two 
already established facts.
2. The presumption of “cow” as including the referent a particu-
lar cow is required to make the two consistent.
While the solution—“cow” indicates a particular cow—initially seems to 
give up cowhood as the referent of “cow,” Mukula explains that this is 
a kind of lak܈a۬Ɨ known as upƗdana, or “inclusion.” That is to say, the 
particular cow that is indicated does not replace the universal cowhood, 
but the initial, literal referent is now included within the meaning of 
the indicated referent. We have indicated a particular cow, but all cows 
possess in the universal of cowhood, so the universal is still included in 
the referent of “cow.”22
 However, because here, lak܈a۬Ɨ functions in order to obtain the ap-
propriate syntactic relations between words, it is not pragmatic. In fact, 
on KumƗrila’s view, sentence meaning is invariably attained in this man-
ner, or else we are left with a string of disconnected words, referring to 
universals but not doing much else.23 There is no sentence meaning or 
vƗkya for us to use as a basis for our presumption. The speaker has not 
said that p because, until we construe the words by lak܈a۬Ɨ as being in 
relationship, there is no p. I suggest that a better model for this kind of 
lak܈a۬Ɨ is found in the theory of sort-shifting.
TYPE- AND SORT-SHIFTING
In the Western tradition of linguistics and philosophy of language, 
models of sort- and type-shifting are used to represent the relationship 
between the semantics of expressions and assumptions about the world’s 
ontology. “Type” refers to a coarse-grained distinction between such cat-
egories as entities, truth-values, and relationships. “Sort” is a further, 
fine-grained distinction between such categories as universals, particu-
lars, groups, collections, masses, persons, and things. Type-shifting is 
an approach intended to explain the flexibility of semantic expressions. 
Expressions change their meanings as contexts change, but the proposal 
that there is a large number of lexical entries for every single word is 
implausible: How would speakers learn all these definitions? How would 
they know what to do with a novel instance? Further, contexts seem to 
underdetermine the meaning for many ambiguous expressions. We need 
an explanation of how hearers “narrow down” the range of possibilities.
 Rather than postulate multiple lexical entries, type-shifting suggests 
a mechanism that can take contextual values, ontological commitments, 
and principles of compositional semantics to generate the appropriate 
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type for an expression in the given context. Sort-shifting operates with 
the same principles, but at more fine-grained level. Type-shifting might 
function to resolve the conflict between the types in the conjunct below:
John and every woman arrived.24
In this sentence, “John” is an individual entity. The idea is that, when 
someone utters the sentence (3), there is no inferential process that a 
speaker must go through to resolve the ambiguity between John as an 
entity or John as a quantifier (intuitively, most speakers are not even 
aware that such ambiguity exists). Type-shifting functions automati-
cally to resolve the ambiguity for the speaker. The benefit of the theory 
is its flexibility—the same expression can refer to various types with-
out sacrificing compositional semantics. Being an entity is a primitive 
in type-shifting terms and is represented by “e.” “Every woman” is a 
quantifier expression that ranges over entities that are women. One 
way of representing “every woman” is by using brackets, < >, to indicate 
its status as function. The quantifier expression is a function of type < 
<e,t>,t> where “t” represents the primitive notion of a truth-value. Thus, 
“every woman” is a function that takes as input a function from enti-
ties to truth-values, <e,t>, and returns a truth-value, t. We are unable 
to conjoin two nonlike types, but this is necessitated by the verb, so we 
shift “John” to the type < <e,t>,t>. 25
 These types are taken from Richard Montague’s generative semantics, 
which allows for individuals in the discourse, possible worlds, and mo-
ments of time.26 A noun such as “cow” might be understood as type <e, 
t> or a function from an individual (the cow) to a truth-value (which is 
true when the individual is a cow). Such a function might itself be the 
input for another function, such as an adjective, of type < <e,t>,<e,t> >. 
For example, “white” would take “cow” (a function from an individual to 
a truth-value) and yield a function from an individual to a truth-value. 
The function would map to “true” where there is a white cow and “false” 
where there is not.
 The motivation for this model aligns closely with the MƯmƗূsƗ claim 
that words have an eternal, unchanging, and single referent, which is 
a universal. Instead of multiple lexical entries for a verb that can take 
multiple kinds of complements, there is a single entry that shifts under 
contextual constraints. Importantly, the shift is coerced by the presence 
or absence of various compositional factors.
 However attractive such a sparse ontology of types may be for 
set-theoretic modeling, some recent approaches have been in favor of 
expanding the kind and number of inhabitants in the discourse model. 
Sorts, as described above, are included and axiomatic relations are 
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drawn between the entities in the discourse. (It is possible that the 
commitments upon which speakers rely for meaning construction admit 
entities that we would not want in our final ontology.) Shifting models 
are employed to explain phenomena such as metonymy, ambiguity in 
genitive constructions, and so forth. The aim of sort- and type-shifting 
models is to represent the various interpretive possibilities available 
to a hearer for a given expression in a context. These possibilities are 
understood as models that are consistent with the context and syntax.
 Below, I develop an example of sort-shifting before returning to 
Mukula. One area in which a sort-shifting model has been applied is 
genitive modifier phrases. Genitive modifier phrases have a head noun 
(N) in the nominative case and a noun phrase (NP) in the genitive case. 
Take, for example,
stakan moloka (glass of milk)
The N is “glass” (stakan), in the nominative case, and the NP is “of milk” 
(moloka), in the genitive case. The problem with a genitive construction is 
how to construe the “of” relationship between the N and NP. The glass is 
not constituted by milk as its material but is filled by the milk. Borschev 
and Partee (2001) understand the genitive case in Russian as being a 
type that seeks out a relationship with the head N. Which relationship 
is appropriate is given through the sortal information in the lexical 
entry of the head N. When this fails, that same lexical information, plus 
ontological commitments and context, allows us to shift sorts.27
 The relationship between x and y depends on the semantic sort of 
the head noun, N. The meaning of “leg” as “part of the table” is made 
straightforwardly available by the context, where the reference to a 
piece of furniture makes the part-whole relationship salient.
 The problem is explaining for cases like stakan moloka how we move 
from one meaning for stakan—a physical entity that is a container—to 
another meaning for stakan—a quantity of something contained by such 
a container. These are two different types: the first is <e,t> and the sec-
ond <e,<e,t> >, where the entity underlined, <e>, is what Borschev and 
Partee (2001) call a “relational entity.” Since noun phrases in genitive 
constructions are always “looking for” a noun to relate with, their refer-
ent is an entity having some kind of relationship to another entity.28 One 
solution would be to propose multiple lexical entries for stakan. The word 
is simply polysemous. In addition to this simply pushing the problem 
back another level (how do we select which lexical entry is appropri-
ate?), this puts a cognitive load on the interpreter. Further, as Borschev 
and Partee (2001, 148) point out with their imaginative example “full 
hat of mushrooms” (meaning a hat made out of mushrooms), we need 
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an explanation of novel uses. Proposing that there is a lexical entry for 
“hat” which has it as a container burdens our lexicon unduly.
 What Borschev and Partee (2001) suggest is that sorts such as con-
tainer or quantity function as their own quasi-lexical entries, or what 
they call “theories.” A theory for the sort container might be as shown 
below:
Container (y)(x)
sort: physical object x
usage: x can be used to hold/keep substances of the sort y
form: x has an inner part and, when it is used to keep a substance y, 
y is inside x
volume of x: the volume of x’s inner part, so the volume of substance 
x can contain.
Given such a theory, a shift-operater, which Borschev and Partee (2001, 
149) call “Quant,” can be invoked to shift the meaning of words that 
typically are of the sort container to be of the sort quantity.
 In the proper context, the shift-operator will take a semantic 
value that is of the sort container and output the sort quantity. A 
sort-shifting approach to metonymic and other phenomena identifies 
distinctions within a given type, rather than trying to multiply types. 
It is ontologically sparse, since sorts are reducible to the standard 
types in Montague semantics. Thus we might distinguish between 
plural individuals and groups, institutions and things, aggregates and 
stuff—even though each of these pairs could together belong to the 
same type. The result is that, for each sort, we have a theory, like the 
theory of container above. There are relationships between the sorts 
and internal relationships within the sorts (allowing for part-whole 
metonymic shifting).
 Shifting between sorts is governed by these axioms, which give us 
not only the possible available moves but which are most likely for a 
given sort (for example, there is a close relationship between individual 
persons and institutions). The trigger for such a shift could be explained 
by the lexical value of a word itself. Certain verbs may take only specific 
sorts as their direct object, or certain adjectives may modify only specific 
sorts, and so on. When there is a mismatch, what Borschev and Partee 
(2001, 153) call “sortal incorrectness,” the result is a presupposition 
failure or, where possible, a coerced meaning shift.
 It is important to reiterate that Mukula is not working with this 
kind of framework, and we should be wary of attempts to shoehorn his 
four categories of upƗdhi, or ontological kinds, too tightly into a type- or 
HPQ 30_4 text.indd   322 1/21/14   10:55 AM
sort-shifting theory. It may be possible to reconstruct a formal seman-
tics from the texts of the Grammarians (after all, PƗ৆ini developed the 
world’s first generative grammar), but this particular text is sparing 
with the details that would be required. My claim is simply this: that 
in sentences like (1) gaur anubandhyaۊabove, the way that Mukula 
describes lak܈a۬Ɨ as functioning is much more like sort-shifting than 
Gricean pragmatic implication.
 To illustrate this, I suggest a folk ontological theory of what a par-
ticular is:
Particular (y)(x)
sort: particular object x
usage: x is the locus of y’s inherence, where y is a universal
form: x has a spatio-temporal location
There could be a sort-shifting mechanism, Particular, which, when 
sentence (1) is uttered in a context suitable for a particular cow, shifts 
a semantic value of the sort universal to the sort particular.
 Because Mukula postulates that at least one category of words refers 
to universals, many sentences we utter will involve a shift from univer-
sals to particulars.
MUKULA ON METAPHORIC TRANSFER
These conceptual tools in hand, I now return to Mukula’s analysis of 
instances of lak܈a۬Ɨ. After introducing the distinction between mukhya 
(denoted meaning) and lak܈a۬Ɨ (indication) with (1), he goes on to intro-
duce what is also a well-known example in Indian philosophy, analyzed 
in terms of suggestion by Ɩnandavardhana:
(5) gangƗyƗۨ gho܈aۊ(The village is on [the bank of] the Ganges.)
Mukula categorizes this case as lak܈a۬a-lak܈a۬Ɨ, or indirect indication, 
in contrast to (1), which he describes as upƗdana-lak܈a۬Ɨ, or inclusive 
indication. In upƗdana-lak܈a۬Ɨ, the universal of cowhood is included 
as part of the new meaning of “cow,” which is a particular cow. Cases 
of lak܈a۬a-lak܈a۬Ɨ, however, do not have such an inclusive nature, but 
rather are instances of replacement.
 In (5), the word “gangƗyƗۨ” or “Ganges” is in the locative case. There-
fore, since the sentence would literally mean that the village is directly 
on top of the Ganges, we must understand, by indication, that “Ganges” 
means “bank of the Ganges.” As Mukula puts it, a particular stream 
cannot be the substratum (adhikara۬a) of a village. We must under-
stand something different: “bank.” In contrast to (1), where cowhood is 
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included as part of the meaning of a particular cow, a riverbank is not 
part of the meaning of “Ganges.” Therefore, this is indirect indication. 
On Ɩnandavardhana’s view, in the Argument from Transformation, this 
demonstrates that indication requires replacement of meaning, and 
suggestion cannot be cognized. Mukula goes on to argue against this, 
in an illustration of what I am calling “pragmatic indication”:
Presumption of the Bank. The bank is presumed from the fact that the 
speaker must be saying something true and the word “Ganges” refers 
to a particular river if
1. The fact that the speaker must be saying something true and 
the word “Ganges” refers to a particular river are two already 
established facts
2. The presumption of “Ganges” as instead referring to the bank 
of the Ganges is required to make the two consistent.
In this case, the fact that the speaker is taken to be saying something 
true is a case of Grice’s Maxim of Quality, and it is implicitly appealed 
to by Mukula. Later, Mukula explicitly appeals to something like the 
Maxim of Manner to explain why a speaker might not simply say “on 
the bank of the Ganges.” The reason is that the Ganges is associated 
with sanctity and beauty, and the speaker wants to convey that the vil-
lage, by proximity, shares in these properties. The indication of bank 
as the referent of “Ganges” is made salient because of the bank’s close 
proximity to the river. On Ɩnandavardhana’s account, in his Argument 
from Primariness, we cannot derive the suggestion of holiness from the 
meaning of “bank of the Ganges” because it is the river, not the bank, 
that is holy. Mukula argues that, because there is a relationship of near-
ness between the bank and the river, our understanding of the bank is 
influenced by our cognition of the river. Note, however, that the proper-
ties of purity and beauty—which are what Ɩnandavardhana argues are 
given by suggestion—are a consequence of the cognition of the referent 
of “Ganges,” not its indicated meaning “bank.” Thus, there is, as Mukula 
presents things, not a perfect match between indication and sugges-
tion. However, Mukula concludes that the property of holiness, shared 
between the bank and the river, can, contra the Argument from Kind of 
Operation, be understood through indication. Further, this means that, 
even when indication replaces the literal meaning, there can be what 
is putatively “suggested,” contra the argument from transformation.
 However, there is a further complication. Before we can employ 
arthƗpatti to recover the indicated meaning, we need to have a sentence 
meaning. This, as we have seen already, must also be generated by 
lak܈a۬Ɨ. Even if Mukula does not think that all words refer to universals 
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(like the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ), “village” will not refer to a particular village 
until there has been a metonymic or similar shift. The Ganges is the 
object of a proper name, but, without understanding an implicit action 
(“is”), there is no way for the words to have syntactic unity.
 One obvious approach would be to argue that lak܈a۬Ɨ does all of this: 
it functions to unify the words in a sentence and recover something truth-
evaluable, and then it functions to recover something that is not only 
truth-evaluable but the likeliest candidate for what the speaker meant 
by the sentence in that context. There has been scant discussion, either 
in the original MƯmƗূsƗ textual tradition or in modern commentaries, 
about this problem. An exception is a short series of paragraphs in a 
brief essay written by K. K. Raja, primarily to compare Buddhist apoha 
theory and MƯmƗূsƗ lak܈a۬Ɨ. Raja observes,
If an operation can effect only one result, we may have to accept two 
lak܈a۬Ɨ-s. But nobody has spoken about two lak܈a۬Ɨ-s while explain-
ing verbal comprehension of the sentence-meaning, and the law of 
parsimony (lƗghava) requires the simpler approach in solving the 
problem. Hence it seems preferable to assume that only one lak܈a۬Ɨ 
is needed to explain the two effects.29
In support of this view, Raja cites the mid-seventeenth-century 
MƯmƗূsaka, NƗrƗya৆a Bha৬৬a, who says that the shift from universals 
to particulars is required for there to be a unified sentence meaning 
and that the resultant syntactic relations are also the result of lak܈a۬Ɨ. 
However, what Raja omits is that lak܈a۬Ɨ is also appealed to in cases 
where we have syntactic unity, but there is some other inconsistency 
between the sentence and context. If the principle, which Mukula has 
appealed to in the case of mukhya, is that a power is exhausted when it 
has attained its aim, then we do have a principle pairing an operation 
to a single effect. While perhaps we could plausibly understand a single 
operation that aims at an intelligible syntactic whole as consisting in 
several shifts in word-meaning, the aim of intelligibility in a context 
is of a different sort. And, in fact, Mukula himself, in his appeal to the 
difference between sentence meaning (vƗkya) and speaker meaning 
(vƗcya) has admitted as much.
FAT DEVADATTA AND ARTHƖPATTI
Complicating the situation for Mukula is the example of Fat Devadatta 
who does not eat during the day. This sentence is a traditional illustra-
tion of arthƗpatti found in the ĝloka-vƗrttika of the MƯmƗূsƗ philosopher 
KumƗrila. The sentence is as follows:
(6) pƯno devadatto divƗ na bhu۬kte (Fat Devadatta does not eat dur-
ing the day)
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Mukula identifies this as another case of upƗdana-lak܈a۬Ɨ or inclusive 
indication, just like (1) above. He says that the denotion of “fat” is fat-
ness as qualified by not eating during the day. In this context, fatness 
as qualified by eating at night is indicated by arthƗpatti. The fatness as 
an effect includes eating at night in itself as a cause. For this reason, we 
have a case of inclusive indication because we are not understanding a 
new meaning for “fat” other than fatness. Instead, we simply include 
within fatness the appropriate cause. Further, Mukula suggests that we 
understand eating at night rather than drinking during the day because 
the speaker has said “does not eat during the day.”
 As with (5), Mukula has ignored the necessity of generating a syn-
tactic unity from a list of unconnected words. He does not have the 
same problem as the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ, since “fat” can refer to a quality, 
“Devadatta” to the object of a proper name, and “eat” to an action (with 
the caveat that it is unclear whether the action is general or particular). 
However, “day” is plausibly a universal-denoting term, and lak܈a۬Ɨ may 
be required to quantify over a particular range of days.
 The larger problem here is in Mukula’s analysis of the case as analo-
gous to (1) “The cow is to be tied up.” It is simply a stretch to maintain 
that either “does not eat during the day” or “eats at night” is part of the 
meaning of “fat.” What he is trying to do with this category of upƗdana-
lak܈a۬Ɨ is show that lak܈a۬Ɨ does not always require replacing the 
literal meaning with a new, indicated meaning. This is his response to 
the Argument from Transformation in which Ɩnandavardhana claims 
that lak܈a۬Ɨ always replaces the literal meaning with a new one.
 The idea is that the vƗkya (sentence meaning) is incompatible with 
the facts we know about fatness, like that it is typically a result of 
eating food, since to not eat food would result in starvation. Mukula 
appeals to something like Grice’s Maxim of Manner in his observa-
tion that we get “eats at night” instead of “drinks a tonic” because the 
speaker has mentioned the time during which Devadatta does not eat. 
Therefore, we presume that she is implicating that Devadatta eats at 
night and expects us to recognize that this is the reason for her speak-
ing in such a way.
 However, as we have seen, (1) is a case of what I am calling “semantic 
indication,” which functions to unify the words in an uttered sentence 
in such a way as to recover a truth-evaluable sentence meaning. It is 
likely, though not necessary, that, in Mukula’s theory, semantic lak܈a۬Ɨ 
functions for all sentence types (as it does for the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ). 
Now, sentence (6) is a case of “pragmatic indication,” which functions 
to remove incompatibility between a sentence meaning (vƗkya) and 
contextual elements, relying on conversational norms akin to Gricean 
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maxims to do so. The result is that there is an implication that Fat 
Devadatta eats at night, in order to resolve what might, prima facie, 
be an incoherent, though syntactically unified, utterance. Part of the 
motivation for Mukula’s strained interpretation may be his commitment 
to the principle of eka-vƗkyatƗ or the requirement that there must be 
a unified meaning for every sentence. Without inserting, so to speak, 
the eating at night somewhere into the vƗkya, there is a problem: the 
speaker seems to mean two things. Further, Mukula does not want the 
result that the speaker is only saying that Fat Devadatta eats at night, 
since the literal meaning of the sentence must be preserved.
CONCLUSION
As presented, Mukula’s analysis of the overlap between suggestion 
and indication is compelling. Using the examples that I have surveyed, 
Mukula targets Ɩnandavardhana’s arguments from Primariness, Kind 
of Operation, and Transformation. He has shown that the underlying 
mechanism of presumption can ground both a semantic and pragmatic 
kind of indication. I have argued that, if he is to be successful in bring-
ing suggestion completely into the sphere of indication, he must show 
that suggestion shares precisely the same function and domain as 
indication. By Mukula’s own criteria for the demarcation of linguistic 
“powers,” he has more than one kind of lak܈a۬Ɨ: a semantic indication 
that functions like a sort-shifting operator and a pragmatic indication 
that functions like Gricean implication. In his paradigmatic examples 
of lak܈a۬Ɨ, he appeals to both powers, but apparently without sensitiv-
ity to these distinctions, classifying a pragmatic case of lak܈a۬Ɨ with a 
semantic case. In effect, the proponents of vyañjanƗ could agree with 
Mukula that their power is pragmatic lak܈a۬Ɨ by another name, since 
the reductive strategy only succeeds if Mukula can show that he is not 
adding a new power to the two already accepted powers. Thus, the ques-
tion remains: Is pragmatic lak܈a۬Ɨ a new power, or is it identical to one 
of the standard powers given by earlier philosophers?
 The response depends on which philosophical viewpoint one takes 
up. Further complicating the response for Mukula is that his text 
incorporates as many competing philosophical viewpoints as possible 
and attempts to formulate a hybrid account. While the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ 
are explicitly committed to lak܈a۬Ɨ as the power that achieves syn-
tactic unity in a sentence, the PrƗbhƗkara MƯmƗূsƗ are not. In fact, 
the PrƗbhƗkara think that words have referents only in the context of 
a sentence token. For them, there is no such thing as the referent of 
a word in isolation from other words, outside of an utterance context. 
Mukula discusses this view in a short section devoted to the competing 
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theories of sentence meaning. He points out that whether one accepts 
the BhƗ৬৬a or the PrƗbhƗkara view of sentence meaning will impact at 
what stage (logically speaking) lak܈a۬Ɨ occurs.
 For the PrƗbhƗkara, lak܈a۬Ɨ will only have what I have been calling 
a pragmatic role, because the vƗkya is always determined in a context 
of utterance by the power of mukhya. Thus, if one is committed to the 
PrƗbhƗkara analysis of sentence meaning, vyañjanƗ seems to be within 
the scope of lak܈a۬Ɨ, as Mukula argues. While Mukula is trying to in-
corporate the PrƗbhƗkara views into his theory, in his explanation of 
(1) “The cow is to be tied up,” he has sided against the PrƗbhƗkara in 
rejecting semantic lak܈a۬Ɨ.
 As Mukula puts things, for the BhƗ৬৬a, lak܈a۬Ɨ seems only to be se-
mantic, since he says it comes before the sentence meaning or vƗkya. 
On the BhƗ৬৬a view, we do need an additional power to explain prag-
matic implication. But Mukula does not want to accept that mukhya, 
or denotation, yields the particular cow as meant by gaur, since he is 
committed to the referent of “cow” being a universal, so he must accept 
semantic lak܈a۬Ɨ. This is why Mukula argues for what he calls a “com-
bined theory,” or “samuccaya,” in which lak܈a۬Ɨ would occur in both 
stages.
 Mukula does not give the details of this combined theory in his text—
how it is that we understand the referent of words, how the four lexical 
categories earlier given relate to this theory, etc. He simply states that, 
on a combined view, we have lak܈a۬Ɨ in both stages. Mukula’s strategy 
is to expand lak܈a۬Ɨ to have both a semantic and pragmatic role, thus 
edging out the requirement for vyañjanƗ. It may be the case that Mu-
kula’s hybrid account of lak܈a۬Ɨ is ultimately a compelling explanation 
of the relationship between the referents of words, the meanings of 
sentences, the meanings of utterances, and contextual factors. However, 
we are lacking the details of such an account, and the account we have 
contains some internal inconsistencies. Perhaps these inconsistencies 
might be rectified (though this is not my task here).
 As presented, Mukula’s analysis of the overlap between suggestion 
and indication is compelling. He has shown that lak܈a۬Ɨ can function 
in a pragmatic manner, based on the inferential process of arthƗpatti. 
However, if he is to be successful in bringing suggestion completely 
into the sphere of indication, he must show that they share the same 
function and domain. And as I have shown, the classic example of “the 
village on the Ganges” proves problematic in this regard.30
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NOTES
1. Abhinavagupta, writing his commentary on the DhvanyƗloka, argues for 
an additional power, tƗtparya-v܀tti, which is the capacity of a speaker, through 
her intention, to constitute a syntactic unity from a collection of words. Adding 
tƗtparya to the list yields four linguistic powers. Ɩnandavardhana, in contrast, 
identifies only three powers. I will not take up the question of tƗtparya in re-
lationship to lak܈a۬Ɨ. This topic has been addressed by Raja 2000 and Gerow 
1984, as well as others.
2. While this paper uses Sanskrit terminology and example sentences in 
the Sanskrit language, they are accompanied by English translations to assist 
the nonspecialist. Only a few, central Sanskrit terms remain untranslated, 
primarily because there is no theoretically neutral English translation readily 
available.
3. I say “broadly speaking” because the Indian Buddhist tradition had 
a very different view of meaning and understood the referents of words to be 
conceptual constructions or vikalpa.
4. Ğabda-vyƗpƗrato yasya pratƯtis yasya mukyatƗ artha-avaseyasya punar 
lak܈yamƗ۬atvam ucyate. Bha৬৬a 1977, 203.
5. viĞe܈yaۨ na abhidhƗ gacchet k܈Ư۬a-Ğaktir viĞe܈a۬e iti nyƗyƗc chabdasya 
jƗti-mƗtra-pari-avasƗyitvƗt. Bha৬৬a 1977, 201.
6. As Jonarden Ganeri has aptly shown in his exposition of NaiyƗyika 
theories of meaning, Indian philosophy of language was interested in what 
contemporary philosophers working in model theoretic semantics call “assign-
ment functions.” Thus, they were trying to ascertain what relationship held 
between the words in a language and their meanings, where meanings are 
entities external to the speaker/hearer (in other words, not mental concepts). 
See Ganeri 2011, 34ff.
7. Ğabda-vyƗpƗrƗd yasya avyƗdhƗna avagatis mukhyatvam. Bha৬৬a 1977, 
203.
8. sa hi yathƗ sarvebhyo hasta-Ɨdibhyo ’vayavebhyaۊpǌrvam mukham 
avalokyate tadvad eva sarvebhyaۊpratƯyamƗnebhyo ’rtha-antarebhyaۊpǌrvam 
avagamyate. Bha৬৬a1977, 203.
9. In his discussion of aropa (superimposed) and ƗdhyavasƗna (suppressed) 
indication, he observes that for very conventional cases, there is no cognition 
of a relationship between the denotative and indicated meanings, but only the 
indicated meaning by itself. It is by reflection, or vicƗra۬a, that we come to 
know the relationship, and the denotative meaning. Bha৬৬a 1977, 208.
10. See the discussion of rƗjan in section 6.2, Bha৬৬a 1977, 226.
11. While Mukula is clearly indebted to the MƯmƗূsa, he also has views 
in line with the Grammarians. It is unclear with which philosophical school, if 
any, he aligned himself. See McCrea 2008, 264.
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12. For more details on the dispute between the PrƗbhƗkara and BhƗ৬৬a on 
sentence meaning, see Siderits 1991 and Taber 1989. Taber’s point (429n20) 
is well taken and ought to be kept in mind throughout my presentation: the 
PrƗbhƗkara do not deny that there can be a context-independent core to words, 
but they do deny that a word successfully picks anything out, or designates 
anything, outside of a particular sentence.
13. See Jha 1942, 146ff.
14. Ɩnandavardhana 1990, 122.
15. Ibid., 562–63.
16. This aim is stated explicitly only at the end of the work: “lak܈a۬ƗmƗr ga
avagƗhitvaۨ tu dhvaneۊsah܀dayair nǌtanatayopavar۬itasya vidyata iti diĞam 
unmǌlayitum idam atra uktam.” However, as McCrea (2008) has convincingly 
argued, the entire work is structured around this goal and ought to be understood 
in terms of it.
17. sa-ƗkƗ۬k܈Ɨ۬Ɨۨ padƗnƗm eka-arthaۊsamǌho vƗkyam. Ğabdena mukhyaۨ 
lƗk܈a۬ikam abhidhƗ-vyƗpƗram ƗĞritya yad gocarƯ-kriyate tad vƗcyam. Bha৬৬a 
1977, 209.
18. See Lewis 1986.
19. Jha 1942, 157.
20. Grice 1989, 26. The following principles and maxims are taken directly 
from Grice’s “Logic and Conversation.”
21. Jha 1942, 152. See Ganeri 2011, 15–18, on KumƗrila’s analysis. He 
concludes that the distinction between definite and indefinite uses (or when a 
particular cow is indicated or a universal class property is literally denoted) is 
a “pragmatic one.” In my terminology, this kind of metonymical shift falls under 
“semantic” indication because it is a more or less automatic process driven by 
compositional principles rather than Gricean conversational maxims.
22. Mukula does not take up the metaphysics of how individuals are related 
to jƗti, or “universals.” For a discussion of this topic, see Scharf 1996.
23. Raja 2000, 210.
24. Pustejovsky 1993, 76.
25. As with Gricean implicatures, the details are contentious. Here, I am 
sketching the general idea to motivate my reconstruction of Mukula.
26. See, for example, Partee 1976.
27. Borschev and Partee 2001, 144. The original accounts of sort-shifting and 
type-shifting can be found in Partee and Rooth 1983 and Partee and Borschev 
1998. For the sake of illustration, I have adapted examples from their recent 
analysis of the Russian genitive, simply for the clarity with which this paper 
sets out the details.
28. Formalizations can be found in Borschev and Partee 2001. This relational 
N can be represented as: λyλx [Thing(x) & Related-to-y(x)]. My argument does 
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not require a particular transformation into lambda calculus, so I omit these 
details for the sake of perspicuity.
29. Raja 1993, 199.
30. I would like to thank Josh Dever, Larry McCrea, Stephen Phillips, and 
the members of the UT Austin Dissertation Seminar for reading earlier drafts 
of this paper.
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